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The purpose of this research is to examine the budgeted
funding levels allocated to the Commander-in-Chief , U.S.
Pacific Fleet, identify past and present trends in the fleet-
level Navy budgeting process, and to examine the actual
budgeting of Operation & Maintenance funds for the pacific
fleet. The goal of this thesis is to allow the reader to
understand the magnitude of the funds involved in budgeting on
a fleet-wide level, to gain an appreciation for possible
inter-relationships between appropriations, budget activities,
and other funding categories, and to understand how funds are
disbursed to keep the Navy fleet operating at an acceptable
level of readiness.
This thesis will provide a conceptual framework for the
Navy officer' s understanding of the role of the fleet
commander in the budgeting process, define which funds are
controlled by the fleet commander and those that are not, and
provide an overview of the budgetary process at a fleet level.
B. THESIS QUESTIONS
Annually the Navy competes with the Army and Air Force for
the funding appropriated by Congress for national defense.
Each year a budget is prepared and reviewed by each service
and submitted to the Office of the Secretary of the Department
of Defense for compilation, review, and input for the
President's budget proposal to Congress for the following
fiscal year. One integral part of the Department of the
Navy' s budget process is budget submission by the Commander-
in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. In view of the changing funding
environment, a review of past spending is in order. This
thesis will address the following questions:
1. What trends are present in CINCPACFLT budgets in the
period FY 1981 to FY 1991?
2. What patterns are projected in CINCPACFLT budgets for the
period FY 1992 to FY 1997?
3. Has FY 91 and Desert Shield and Desert Storm funding
caused trade-offs with significant operational implications
for CINCPACFLT?
4. What are some of the operational and budgeting
implications for CINCPACFLT of FY 92 to FY 97 budget
projections?
C . BACKGROUND
The general funding climate within the federal government
has changed drastically within the last decade. A large part
of this has to do with the public's awareness of annual budget
deficits, an ever-increasing national debt, "pork barrel"
spending by Congress, and general perceptions of waste, fraud,
abuse and mismanagement of public funds in the federal budget.
The federal budget is under close scrutiny, now more than
ever. The public has given Congress and the administration
the mandate to reduce the annual budget deficit. In
attempting to reduce the budget there is constant pressure for
a shift in national priorities away from the large defense
budgets of previous years toward deficit reduction and
domestic entitlement and social programs.
Previously, the defense establishment and the Navy enjoyed
a period of growth that spurred new strategy and goals to
maintain greater international influence through military
presence on a global scale. As stated by Jacques S. Gansler,
a member of the faculty of the John F. Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard University and former Department of
Defense Official:
"At the end of the 1970' s the United States was spending
approximately $150 billion a year on its defense
establishment. The public felt that this did not provide
a "strong America, " and gave Ronald Reagan a mandate for
significant increases in the defense budget. Within six
years the defense budget had almost doubled and an extra
trillion dollars has been spent on increasing Americans
military power"
.
This is no longer the case. The dominant issue in federal
budgeting is the debate over reduced defense expenditures and
spending for domestic social program and entitlements, or
"guns versus butter"
.
Since the end of the Korean war, the annual level of
defense expenditures has remained relatively constant, at a
level around $200 million after adjusting for inflation. The
share of the Gross National Product devoted to defense
however, has decreased from 12 percent in the 1950 A s to
approximately 6 percent during the Reagan presidency.
During the same time period, non-defense federal
expenditures, including entitlements have increased from a
level approximately the same in size of the defense budgets of
the 1950' s to three times that amount by the 1970' s. During
the 1980' s, national security accounted for approximately 25
percent of the annual federal budget, while entitlements
represented more than 45 percent of the budget.
Despite a significant decrease in the size of constant
dollar defense budget authority since 1986, there is the
misconception that defense represents the largest share of the
federal budget. Defense is often the target of cuts and
congressional attack. 1 The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990
agreed to by Congress and the President has forged a path of
budget cuts for defense for the near future.
In 1985, the Department of Defense was appropriated its
largest budget ever, and has experienced decreases in real
dollar terms in every year thereafter. The federal
government's current budget plan calls for more drastic cuts
throughout the defense establishment through fiscal year 1997,
with each service decreasing force size, and postponing or
terminating procurement programs.
l
. A. Wildavsky, chapter 9, pp 363-374, The New Politics




The primary scope of this thesis is on the appropriations
to the Department of the Navy and the pacific fleet in the
period from fiscal year 1981 to fiscal year 1991, and
appropriations projected for the period from fiscal year 1992
to fiscal year 1996. After examination of previous funding
levels, projections of future levels will be analyzed.
The second component of the thesis will examine the
budgeting of Operations & Maintenance funds within the pacific
fleet by the budget activities of Strategic Forces, General
Forces, Intelligence and Communications, Airlift and Sealift,
Training-Medical-Personnel and other general costs, and
Administration and associated costs. Data will be presented
to define a baseline and trends within the O&M account.
The scope of this thesis will be restricted to only Navy
active force funding, excluding reserve and Marine Corps
funding.
E . METHODOLOGY
The primary methodology of this thesis is field research.
All data analyzed in the thesis was collected through personal
contact and interviews with the offices of the Navy
Comptroller, CINCPACFLT Comptroller, and review of Navy budget
documents. The views expressed in this thesis regarding the
CINCPACFLT budget and budget process are those of the author.
Analytical methods appropriate to budget evaluation
include common size and other statistical analysis. Data are
indexed using a variety of economic measures including Gross
National Product, the level of DOD funding, levels of DON
funding, levels of Operations & Maintenance funding, and
percentage of change of funding over the period 1981-1997.
Where appropriate, funding is adjusted to a constant dollar
base of fiscal year 1985.
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION
This thesis is organized a follows: Chapter II discusses
CINCPACFLT's budget process in general, and presents
historical budget data from fiscal year 1981 to fiscal year
1991. Its purpose is to familiarize the reader with the
budget process and key players, and to identify the major
budget trends of the period.
Chapter III addresses the operational and future budget
impacts of the previous budgets, and includes some of the
implications of Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm
budgeting
.
Chapter IV presents budget data for the period of fiscal
year 1992 to fiscal year 1997, and discusses the impact that
these budgets may have on strategy, missions and operations.
Chapter V provides answers to the research questions in
Chapter I and identifies areas for further research.
II. BUDGET PLAYERS AND PROCESSES
A. THE BUDGET CHAIN OF COMMAND AND KEY PLAYERS
Within the Department of the Navy, the budget process
involves a number of different levels of the financial chain of
command. To demonstrate this, it is useful to examine the
simplified path taken by a submitted budget estimate. In general,
as a budget estimate is forwarded up the chain of command, it is
reviewed, adjusted, and compiled with other estimates to become the
reviewing authority's own budget submission to the next level in
the chain. The process of projecting a budget estimate and
formulating a service's budget starts at the cost center level, and
is then forwarded to a responsibility center for compilation and
adjustment. The responsibility center submits its compiled and
adjusted estimate to a intermediate level, to a sub-claimant major
claimant, or if there is no sub-claimant directly to a major
claimant for review, adjustment, and compilation, becoming an
integral part of the major claimant's budget submission. From this
point the budget estimate is forwarded to the Comptroller of the
Navy (NAVCOMPT) and the review and adjustment process is repeated
by NAVCOMPT and the Office of the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV)
.
The next review and adjustment of the Navy budget takes place
outside of the Department of the Navy (DON) , within the executive
branch of the government. The budget submission is forwarded to
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) where again there is
review and adjustment performed primarily by OSD but also including
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) . After joint review and
acceptance by OMB, the proposed budget is submitted for inclusion
in the President's budget proposal. After approval and review, the
President's budget is submitted to Congress for review, approval,
and enactment
.
The major players in the DON budgeting process are, in
descending order, Congress, the President and OMB, OSD, NAVCOMPT,
major claimants and sub-claimants, responsibility centers, and cost
centers (field activities)
.
The two levels of the chain of command external to the Navy
perform the same general functions as the internal offices of DON,
but on a larger scale, reviewing, adjusting, and compiling all
three military services and federal agencies that provide specified
services for the benefit of the services into a unified defense
budget. There are some differences between the internal and
external reviewing authorities worth noting.
First, the Office of the Secretary of Defense is comprised
of staff advisors to the Secretary of Defense on various areas
including budgeting, acquisition, manpower, policy and planning.
The primary office responsible for DOD budgeting is the Office of
the Department of Defense Comptroller. This office is responsible
for conducting a joint budget review with OMB and recommending
adjustments as appropriate as noted. During budget execution, this
office also reviews spending plans, releases funds to the Military
departments, and monitors execution.
Second, the Office of Management and Budget assists the
President in directing and evaluating the organization, management,
and operation of the Executive Branch. Primary functions include
preparation of the proposed federal budget, formulation of the
government's fiscal program and supervision and control of the
administration's budget. OMB reviews the DON budget submission
jointly with OSD, making recommendations to the President regarding
significant issues not resolved during the joint review and
forwards the President's defense budget to the Congress. After
authorizing and appropriating legislation has been enacted, OMB
apportions funds to executive departments and monitors execution of
spending and programs
.
The other five entities cited, internal to the Department of
the Navy, perform separate but similar functions. Again, in
descending order they are the Office of the Secretary of the Navy
and the Comptroller of the Navy (NAVCOMPT)
, major claimants and
sub-claimants, responsibility centers, and cost centers.
First, NAVCOMPT is charged with all comptroller duties,
including the management of all functions of the budget. Budget
decisions must be reached and reviewed during all phases of the
budgeting cycle, including formulation, presentation, analysis,
enactment and execution. During formulation, NAVCOMPT provides
substantive guidance and technical direction to lower levels for
preparation and submission of the budget. During presentation and
analysis, NAVCOMPT reviews, justifies, and defends its budget
submissions to OSD, OMB, and Congress. After enactment, during
execution, NAVCOMPT is responsible for the allocation of funds to
responsible offices, the review of financial performance measured
against budget plans and programs, and the adjustment of
allocations when and if needed.
Major claimants are those offices, commands or headquarters
designated as an administering office under the operation and
maintenance appropriation guidelines issued by NAVCOMPT. Major
claimants receive operating budgets directly from the offices of
the Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) via
NAVCOMPT. Examples of a major claimant are the Commander in Chief,
U.S. Pacific Fleet, Naval Sea Systems Command, and Headquarters,
U.S. Marine Corps. Major claimants are also designated as budget
submitting offices.
Budget submitting offices (BSO's) are responsible for the
preparation of budget estimates within the program, fiscal and
policy guidance provided from higher authority. They are
responsible for submitting these estimates in the appropriate form
and on required due dates to NAVCOMPT. They are responsible for
having the necessary personnel attend budget hearings and for
providing additional information requested to justify and defend
their estimates. Finally, they are responsible for reviewing the
adjustments and recommendations made at the NAVCOMPT and SECNAV
level review, and defending the original submission when necessary.
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As a budget submitting office, CINCPACFLT submits budget estimates
only for the Operations and Maintenance, Navy (0&M,N) and Other
Procurement, Navy (OP,N) appropriations. Budget estimates from all
other elements of the Navy are received from budget submitting
offices within their own chain-of-command by the same or similar
process. All appropriations are then apportioned and allocated
from responsible offices to users, via financial and operational
chains of command.
Sub-claimants are offices or commands designated as
suballocation holders which receive suballocations from a major
claimant. An example of a sub-claimant is Commander, U.S. Naval
Surface Forces, receiving an allocation in the form of an
"operational budget" from CINCPACFLT.
Responsibility centers are an organizational unit headed by
an officer or supervisor responsible for the management of
resources in the unit and who, in most cases, can significantly
influence the expenses incurred in the unit. In other terms, a
responsibility center is defined as a field activity. An example
is Naval Station Long Beach. Responsibility centers and field
activities receive operating targets, or OPTAR's, from their
operating budget holder, in the prior example COMNAVSURFPAC
.
The last element of the budget chain of command is the cost
center, defined as a subdivision of a field activity or
responsibility center for which identification of costs is desired
and which is amenable to cost control through one responsible
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supervisor. An example is that of the Public Works Department,
Naval Station Long Beach.
In the case of the material presented in this thesis,
CINCPACFLT acts first as a budget submitting office, compiling,
reviewing and adjusting the budget submissions of COMNAVSURFPAC,
COMNAVAIRPAC, COMNAVSUBPAC, and TRAPAC, as well as other activities
directly under CINCPACFLT control. The compiled budget submission
is then forwarded to NAVCOMPT, and CINCPAC retains responsibility
for defense of the budget and for submitting reclamas to dispute
marks made at higher levels of review and approval.
After appropriation approval and enactment by Congress and
apportionment of the budget by OMB, CINCPAC assumes the role of the
major claimant, distributing authority to the commands under its
cognizance to incur obligations and contract for services.
B. THE SIMPLIFIED BUDGET FORMULATION PROCESS
For the Department of the Navy, the budget process may be
viewed to consist of four major phases. The first three phases are
similar in purpose and process, namely, submission of estimates to
higher authority for review and approval. The first phase is the
submission of budget estimates to the Comptroller of the Navy by
offices throughout the department for review and final approval by
the Secretary of the Navy. The second phase is the submission of
budget estimates by the Department of the Navy to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and the Office of Management and Budget for
review and final approval by the Secretary of Defense and the
12
President. The third phase is the submission of budget estimates
by the President to the Congress for its review and approval. The
last phase is the enactment of appropriations by the Congress and
execution of the appropriations by the Department of the Navy. At
this point a more detailed analysis of each phase of the process is
useful
.
During the first phase, the starting point for development
of the DON budget is the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) . The
POM outlines the objectives of the military departments (MILDEP)
,
giving guidance for planning and action of all major offices of the
services. After review of the POM, NAVCOMPT issues guidance and
financial controls for submission of the budget shortly to
subordinate commands. Budget submitting offices then prepare
detailed budget exhibits and submit them to NAVCOMPT. After
receipt of these exhibits, NAVCOMPT budget analysts review them and
conduct hearings to gather additional information. "Mark-ups" or
adjustments up or down on each appropriation are then prepared and
issued to budget submitting offices as well as to appropriation and
resource sponsors. If any of the recipients of these mark-ups
disagree with the issues raised in the mark-up, they are permitted
to submit reclamas stating their position and reasoning behind the
disagreement. All reclamas are reviewed by the NAVCOMPT staff,
with unresolved differences adjudicated by the Director and
Associate Director of Budget and Reports, consulting with senior
officials in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. A
summary of the budget as it stands after this review, highlights of
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changes from the POM, and any unresolved issues are then presented
to SECNAV. After final SECNAV decisions, appropriation levels and
detailed control numbers are provided to budget submitting offices
for preparation of corrected budget to OSD and OMB.
The Department of the Navy budget review is the process of
transforming the individual budgets of the various offices within
the Department into a "balanced" Department budget. It provides
the Secretary of the Navy and his senior advisors an opportunity
for decision-making and control of the resources of the Department.
During phase two, budget submission to OSD and OMB and its
review, the baseline for budget analysis is the Program Decision
Memoranda (PDM) . Within DON, the starting point is the issuance of
control totals that incorporate PDM decisions along with all
decisions that occurred during the DON budget review. NAVCOMPT
prepares the formal transmittal memorandum, the summary exhibits,
and the reports that constitute the official budget submission.
Budget submitting offices prepare detailed exhibits and submit them
to NAVCOMPT for consolidation and clearance, and subsequent
submission to OSD and OMB. The OSD and OMB staffs review these
exhibits and conduct hearing to gather additional information, then
prepare Program Budget Decisions (PBD's) which are ultimately
signed by either the SECDEF, the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the
DOD Comptroller after review by the Defense Planning Resources
Board. PBD's are often reviewed in draft form by interested
offices and, if necessary, a DON position is forwarded by NAVCOMPT
in a formal, coordination document.
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Near the end of the review, normally in early December,
SECNAV is given the opportunity to discuss with SECDEF or his
Comptroller or Deputy Secretary those unresolved PBD's that are
deemed most critical to DON in a Major Budget Issues (MBI) meeting.
Following the MBI meetings with all the Military Departments,
SECDEF meets with the Director of OMB and the President to resolve
any issues raised by OMB and to obtain final Presidential
decisions. Following this negotiation point, decisions on high
priority and previously unresolved issues are released in the form
of PBD's. Then conforming controls are issued for final
preparation of the President's Budget.
The joint budget review conducted by OSD and OMB transforms
the DON budget into part of (first) the Secretary of Defense's
budget and (second) the President's budget. This review provides
the final control and decision-making opportunities for both the
Secretary of Defense and the President prior to submission of the
Defense budget to Congress. While the Department of the Navy
participates in this review, the process is controlled by OSD and
OMB.
In phase three, submission of the President's Budget and
congressional review, the starting point is the President's
transmittal of the budget to Congress. Within the Executive
Branch, preparation of material supporting the President's Budget
begins near the end of the joint OSD/OMB budget review. OMB
establishes the "top line" agency budget controls after final
Presidential decisions, OSD establishes appropriation controls
15
within this "top line" in the final PBD's, and finally NAVCOMPT
establishes line-item and budget submitting office controls within
these appropriation controls- These controls are established to
allow OMB, OSD, and DON to prepare budget documents and
justification material that consistently support the President's
Budget down to the individual program and line-item level. After
receipt of the President's Budget, Congress conducts hearings with
Executive Branch representatives, ranging from the Director of OMB
and SECDEF to functional Assistant Secretaries and CNO staff
including individual program managers in DON. After reviewing the
President's Budget in subcommittee and full appropriation
committee, Congress first enacts Budget Resolution legislation
which sets ceilings on the total Federal budget and the total
National Defense function. It then authorizes programs (Armed
Services Committee) to guide decisions on appropriations, and
finally enacts appropriations.
Consistent with the policy of decentralization of budgeting
in DON, offices and commands also participate in the preparation of
justification material and in defending the budget before the
Congress
.
In the fourth and final phase of the Navy's budget process,
enactment of appropriations by the Congress and execution of the
budget, the enactment of appropriation bills and their signature by
the President provides the legal authority to begin the execution
of the budget. If necessary, appropriations acts may be augmented
later in the fiscal year by a supplemental appropriation act to
16
fund unforeseen, underestimated or unknown additional program
requirements. Following enactment of appropriations, the
Department of the Treasury issues warrants to establish specific
appropriation accounts for execution and accounting purposes.
NAVCOMPT then requests apportionment of funds, via the Comptroller
of DOD, from OMB. After apportionment by 0MB, NAVCOMPT allocates
funds to the various responsible offices, primarily to the Chief of
Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Chief
of Naval Research. These offices in turn allocate and suballocate
funds to administering offices and operating budget holders. These
offices then execute the budget through the signing of contracts,
project orders, work requests, and other funding documents. These
documents authorize organizations and agencies to provide specified
goods and or services and to obligate the government to make
payments for the goods and services. Reports are prepared at the
appropriation, budget activity and line-item levels and provide for
oversight of the execution process. They are compared against
financial plans. During the execution phase, funds can be moved to
meet unforeseen, urgent, or unanticipated obligations through
reprogramming or by transfer of funds either under congressional
approval or notification 2 .
In summary, CINCPACFLT is involved in all four phases of the
DON budgeting process. Initially, it acts as a budget submitting
2Process descriptions, phases 1 through 4 from Comptroller of
the Navy Instruction 7102. 2B, Department of the Navy Budget
Guidance Manual, Part 1 .
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office, compiling, reviewing, and adjusting the budget estimates
from command and agencies under its control, and forwarding these
estimates to NAVCOMPT. CINCPACFLT then acts as a defender of the
budget, providing additional information and testimony in support
of NAVCOMPT' s and SECNAV s approval stage, and answering mark-ups
through reclamas . This action may be repeated again for OSD' s and
OMB' s joint review, and then again before the congressional Budget
Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. Finally, funds are
apportioned to the responsible offices, down to the major
claimants, and then allocated to the organizations under CINCPACFLT
cognizance.
C. THE GENERAL BUDGETING TRENDS FROM 1981 TO 1991
Budget data is presented in this thesis in several different
forms, including budget authority (BA) , outlays, total obligational
authority (TOA) , and nominal and real dollars. The definitions of
these terms are as follows:
• BUDGET AUTHORITY: Authority provided by law to enter into
obligations which generally result in immediate or future
outlay of Government funds, The basic form of budget
authority are in terms of appropriations.
• OUTLAY: A budget term used to describe an actual cash payment
or issuance of check against the Treasury to satisfy a
government obligation. Outlays are results of the present and
past years' requests for services and materials.
• NOMINAL DOLLARS: Dollars not adjusted to a base year, current
dollars
.
• REAL DOLLARS: Dollars adjusted to a base year through the use
of a deflator or inflation factor, adjusted dollars.
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• TOTAL OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY: The total amount of funds
available for programming in a given year, regardless of the
year the funds are appropriated, obligated, or expended. It
includes new obligational authority, unprogrammed or
reprogrammed obligational authority from prior years, advance
funding for programs to be financed in the future and
unobligated balances transferred from other appropriations.
1 . National Defense and the Department of Defense
To gain an appreciation for the complexities of defense
budgeting some preliminary analysis is necessary. During any
budgeting year, the majority of the federal budget (the base) is
relatively fixed, and some of it may be obligated from
appropriation legislation passed in earlier budget years.
Approximately one quarter of the current year' s federal budget is
controllable, or "discretionary". Most entitlements, generally
involving redistribution of income, benefits or compensations in
some kind, are funded automatically and programmed into the future
with adjustments by formula, based on decisions made when the
legislation was enacted. Entitlements are automatic in nature, and
do not have to be adjusted annually, although they often are
adjusted in the short-term. The enactment language of entitlements
is constructed so that action is required on the part of Congress
to stop the distribution of entitlement funds. If no action is
taken, entitlements continue as authorized, whether the original
assumptions correctly reflect the conditions at hand, e.g, rates of
inflation indexed into entitlements.
On the other hand, the defense budget is proposed and passed
on an annual basis, and is subject to reduction at all reviews.
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Although both defense and entitlement spending have increased in
size, their increases have not been proportional. From 1950 to
1970, defense and entitlement spending were almost equivalent in
size. Since 1970 non-defense spending has grown to almost 3 times
the size of defense spending.
The actual size of the Defense Budget is relatively small in
comparison with the remaining federal budget. In 1989, defense
spending has accounted for 27 percent of the federal budget, and it
has accounted for 82 percent of the discretionary budget.
As a percentage of the Gross National Product, since 1948
(with the exception of the peak of U.S. involvement in Viet Nam)
the defense budgets average well under 10 percent. Table 1
illustrates the percentage of GNP (billions of dollars) allocated
to the National Defense function (050) , and the percentage
allocated to the Department of Defense.
Table 1 NATIONAL DEFENSE AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OUTLAYS
(as a Percentage of GNP)
FY 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89
GNP 2986 3139 3322 3687 3937 4163 4419 4731 5023
050 5.3 5.9 6.3 6.2 6.4 6.6 6.4 6.1 6.0
DOD 5.2 5.8 6.2 6.0 6.2 6.4 6.2 6.0 5.9
As can be seen, the size of GNP of the National Defense and
Department of Defense budgets were relatively constant in the
1980' s. The fact that defense budgets are proposed and reviewed
annually, and are discretionary in nature cause them to come under
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constant examination. This is also because of the misperception
that they constitute the largest portion of the federal budget.
It is interesting to note the trends illustrated in table 1.
Both the National Defense and DOD components increased in the early
1980' s, reached an all-time high in the year 1986, then decreased.
Since outlays are the actual release of funds and cashing of
Treasury checks, funds often satisfy obligations from previous
years. The highest point of appropriation (BA) before decreasing
was 1985. In examining the figures, the defense budgeting in the
Reagan era ranged from about 5.3 to 6.6 percent of the GNP and
approximately 5.2 to 6.4 percent to the Department of Defense
directly. Since GNP is estimated beforehand and actually
calculated after the budget year has passed, the value of this
comparison is limited. However, since GNP has been estimated to
continue increasing in the 1990' s, it illustrates that a conscious
effort has been made on the part of decision makers to control
future defense outlays.
During the 1970' s, under the Ford and Carter administration,
defense experienced only moderate funding when compared to the
1980' s. In fact, in 1970, the total national defense outlay was
$81.7 billion, increasing to $86.5 billion in 1975 and to $134
billion by 1980. In a matter of 10 years the outlay and total
obligation authority levels increased by more than 160 percent from
the 1970 figures in nominal dollars. The defense budget exceeded
$300 billion before decreasing.
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To demonstrate the relative trends, Table 2 shows the Outlay
levels for the National Defense function in nominal and adjusted
(to 1985 dollars) for the fiscal years 1981 to 1991 in millions of
dollars, and the percentage of change from the previous year's
level. Total outlays for the Budget Function 050, National Defense
includes funding outside of the Department of Defense. The other
funding is for Budget Subfunctions 053 and 054, Atomic Energy
Defense activities and "Other" Defense related activities. These,
however, account for less than 3 percent of the total funds in
table 2.
Table 2 NATIONAL DEFENSE OUTLAYS 1981 TO 1991
(millions of dollars)
FY 81 82 83 84 85
CURRENT
$
157,513 185,309 209, 903 227,413 252,748
1985 $ 124,393 160,362 188,794 214,552 252,748
GROWTH N 12.2 17.6 13.3 8.3 11.1
GROWTH R 19.6 28. 9 17.7 13.6 14.3
86 87 88 89 90 91
273, 375 281, 999 290,361 303,559 299,331 298, 910
272,567 273, 966 281, 935 294,880 289,755 287,451
8.2 3.2 3.0 4.5 -1.4 -0.2
11.2 0.5 2.9 4.6 -1.7 -0.8
(R denotes real, N denotes nominal)
Examining the unadjusted and adjusted outlay figures show
increasing defense budgets until fiscal years 1990 and 1991. In
the period 1981 to 1989 the nominal figures almost doubled.
These figures show an increasing trend in defense toplines. When
examining the real percentage change based on the previous year's
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budget a clearer picture emerges. Early in the decade, defense
budgets surged, following the change in administration and its new
policy for a stronger defense, sponsoring increasing funding at
more than 20 percent of the previous year's budget. Increases
continued but at a more moderate pace, at roughly $20 billion
(nominal) per year, growing smaller toward 1985 and 1986, and then
decreasing below half the level of earlier annual gains. In
percentage terms, increases became negative in 1990. During this
period, these levels combined with the prevailing economic state
actually resulted in real dollar losses for defense. In summary,
impressive real and nominal gains were made from 1981 to 1985, and
real losses were sustained from 1986 to 1991.
To demonstrate the size of losses sustained, table 3 shows
the annual budget authority voted to DOD from 198 6 to 1991, and the
percentage of decline in constant year dollars.
Table 3 ANNUAL BUDGET AUTHORITY
(millions of dollars)
FY 86 87 88 89 90 91
BA 281,390 279,469 283,755 290,837 292, 999 272,282
% LOSS -4.4 -3.8 -2.1 -1.5 -2.4 -11.3
These figures clearly display the results of efforts to
control defense spending, with clear deliberate cuts that decision
makers could show to the voting public.
The major appropriations within the National Defense Function
can be isolated and examined as well. The appropriations for
National Defense include Military Personnel (MP) , which consists of
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pay and allowance for active duty, reserve and retired personnel;
Operations and Maintenance (O&M) , which buys among other things
spare and repair parts, aircraft and ship fuels, and civilian
salaries; Procurement (PRO) for acquiring major weapon systems such
as aircraft, ships, and weapons; Research , Development, Test and
Evaluation (RDT&E) for testing and developing new materials,
components and hardware for future use; Military Construction
(MILCON) for construction of facilities and housing; and Family
Housing (FH) for active duty personnel and dependents.
The procurement account is actually a compilation of five
separate accounts with specific areas of procurement. They are
Aircraft Procurement Navy, financing the procurement of Navy and
Marine Corps aircraft and related supporting equipment; Weapons
Procurement Navy, financing the procurement of missiles, torpedoes,
guns and supporting equipment for Navy and Marine Corps forces;
Procurement Marine Corps, financing the cost of Marine Corps
ammunition, tracked combat vehicles, weapons, guided missiles,
communication and electronic equipment, and equipment for other
Marine general purpose forces; Other Procurement Navy, financing
the procurement, production and modernization of equipment not
otherwise provided for; and Shipbuilding and Conversion Navy,
providing for the construction of new ships and the conversion of
existing fleet assets.
The relative size of each year's annual appropriation is
displayed by percentage in Table 4, in relation to the overall
National Defense (DOD only, subfunction 051) . Within each
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appropriation certain trends particular to DOD as a whole are
evident
.
Table 4 BUDGET FUNCTION 050 OUTLAYS BY APPROPRIATION
(percent of annual total)
FY 81 82 83 85 86
MP 31.2 30.5 29.8 29.0 27.7
O&M 33.7 33.0 31.8 30.5 29.5
PRO 22. 9 23.9 26.2 28.0 28.7
RDT&E 9.9 9.8 10.1 10.5 11.1
MILCON 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7
FH 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1
86 87 88 89 90 91
26.9 26.3 27.2 27.4 26.1 27.9
28.4 27.8 30.0 29.5 30.5 30.0
28.7 29.5 27.4 27.7 27.9 27.5
12.2 12.3 12.3 12.5 12.9 12.4
1.9 2.1 2.8 1.8 1.8 1.6
1.
1
1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2
Within the military pay and allowances accounts the general
trend has been that of a decrease. In 1981, 31.2 percent of the
total DOD budget was allocated for pay and allowances for manpower.
In 1987 that figure fell to a low of 26.3 percent, and climbed
slightly before falling to 26.1 percent. Over this same time
period DOD experienced a number of federal pay increases, that
lessens some the changes in active duty numbers.
Within the operations and maintenance accounts a similar
trend has been exhibited. In 1981, O&M accounted for 33.7 percent
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of the total budget. Since that time it has decreased to a low of
27.8 percent in 1987, and then remained between 2 9 and 30 percent.
The reductions in the account may have occurred because of
increasing costs of critical items, such as repair parts and fuel
for ships and aircraft.
In contrast, the procurement and research and development
accounts have experienced growth trends. Procurement increased
dramatically within the Reagan era, starting at 22.9 percent in
1981, climbing to 28 percent within 3 years, reaching a high of
almost 30 percent in 1987, and leveling out at 28 percent at the
beginning of the Bush era. In real terms the gains are
significant, and in nominal terms this equates to an increase
within the procurement account of more than 45 billion dollars in
6 years. The results, however, are contrary to what might be
expected. Stated differently,
"constant dollar unit costs for major defense systems have
grown much faster than constant-dollar total budgets for these
systems. The results has been the purchase of smaller
quantities of new systems, delayed modernization, and
shrinking capabilities." 3
It appears that the budget decisions in the area of procurement
respond in part to a changing marketplace. The defense marketplace
generally has experienced significant increases in price and lead
and development times, providing fewer units of desired weapons
systems to buyers.
3 J. Ronald Fox and James L. Field, The Defense Management
Challenge (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1988), p. 10.
26
Similarly, research and development experienced a continual
increase throughout the period, starting at 9.9 percent of the
total DOD budget, growing to more than 12.9 percent in 1990. In
nominal terms, RDT&E doubled, from 15.2 billion to 37 billion
dollars. Today, military research and development makes up more
than 60 percent of the total government investment in R&D.
The accounts for military construction and family housing
remained somewhat stable over the period examined. Family housing
consumed roughly 1.1 percent of the annual budgets and construction
about 1.8 percent. Military construction experienced only one
short period of growth between 1987 and 1988, jumping up to 2.1 and
2.8 percent respectively, then returning to less than 2 percent.
The result has been little construction of new housing. New
facility construction has not been at a level capable of supplying
the housing needed, nor at a level capable of meeting new systems
requirements
.
Overall, it appears as if the increases in the amount of the
budget allocated for procurement and research and development has
been at the cost of military pay and operations and maintenance
accounts through 1987. From 1988 through 1991, all accounts
remained relatively stable, suggesting that DOD has attained a
baseline level for these accounts. Again, since the data examined
is in the form of outlays, reductions actually began in FY 1986.
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2 . Department of the Navy
From the financial standpoint, the Department of the Navy
operates much differently that the other services. This is in
part due to the fact that the goals and missions of the Navy differ
greatly from those of the Air Force and the Army, as do their
weapon systems and tactics. This is in turn, reflected in the
Navy's budgets.
In general, the Navy prospered in the Reagan era. In almost
every year the Navy claimed a larger than expected percentage of
the total DOD budget. Assuming that all 3 services have equivalent
importance in a strategic sense, one would expect an equal
allotment of funding to each service. In addition, several
agencies receive funding for DOD-wide activities (3 percent of
total budget) . A rational assumption then is that each service
should expect to receive about 32 percent of the annual DOD budget.
Fortunately for the Navy, this has not been the case. Table 5
demonstrates the disproportionate percentage of DOD's annual budget
authority allocated to the Navy from 1986 to 1991.
Table 5 DOD ANNUAL BUDGET AUTHORITY
(millions of dollars)
FY 86 87 88 89 90 91
DOD 281,290 279,469 283,755 290, 837 292, 999 272, 953
NAVY 96,113 93,500 100,281 97, 675 99, 977 92,158
% 34.2 33.5 35.3 33.6 34.1 33.8
As a side note, under this assumption any service share would
sum to an amount of $544.4 billion for the entire period. Over
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this same period the Navy has received the above share plus an
additional $35.3 billion to some extent at the expense of the other
services. The percentage of funding allocated to the Air Force
also has been disproportionate, but not to the degree of the
Navy' s
.
Table 6 consists of Navy's Total Obligational Authority over
the period of 1981 to 1991, the same time frame examined for the
DOD in table 3. In order to allow direct comparison of the figures
in tables 3 and 6, it is necessary to include the funding received
by the Department of the Navy for Marine Corps and Reserve
programs
.
Table 6 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY TOTAL OBLIGATION AUTHORITY
FY 81 82 83 84 85
MPN 21.1 20.5 19.0 17.9 24.1
OMN 34.1 31.4 28.2 27.4 29.5
PRO 34.6 37.3 41.3 34.3 33.8
RDT&E 8.8 8.6 7.7 8.6 9.7
MILCON 1.4 2.2 1.4 1.4 1.7
FH * * 0.9 0.7 0.7
86 87 88 89 90 91
25.3 26.2 25.0 27.2 26.9 29.5
27.5 27.6 27.1 28.6 27.6 29.2
33.8 33.7 36.1 32.0 34.5 29.7
10.2 9.8 9.3 9.5 9.5 9.1
1.7 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.2 1.2
0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9
T* indicates zero funding)
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Again, the Navy' s budget reflects its unique organizational
structure and missions, and thus allocations to accounts are not
the same as those found in the composite DOD budget. First, from
1981 until 1984, MPN fluctuated between 21 and 18 percent, moving
in a downward direction as did DOD MP accounts. However, DOD
allocations for military pay hovered between 31 and 29 percent,
because of more manpower intensive Army and Air Force strategy
requirements. After 1985 the gap narrowed as Navy figures
increased, although DON figures still remained lower than the DOD
composite. Contrary to statements made by DOD on manpower
reductions, it appears as if a greater percentage of the DON budget
has been allocated to MPN, increasing slightly every year since
1985, although the size of the fleet has not increased
significantly
.
The Navy also allocates a greater percentage of its total
budget to hardware procurement. From 1981 to 1991, the Navy
devoted approximately 34 percent of its budget to procurement,
primarily investment, while DOD as a whole devoted only around 27
percent. It appears again as if the basic missions and operating
environment of the Navy make it more hardware intensive than the
DOD as a composite. Procurement within DON has fluctuated from a
high in 1983, sustained around 34 percent after 1984 and then cut
only in 1991.
Research and development experienced the same general climb
in the early half of the period, growing to over 10 percent, but
then decreased in 1987 and remained stable until a cut in 1991.
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This is contrary to the DOD pattern of constant increase. Instead,
it equates to a relatively stable level in nominal terms, about
$9.3 billion per year until 1991 when $1 billion was cut. It is
also notable that DON R&D is funded at about 3 percent less than
DOD as a composite.
Additionally, when examining the DON figures for the period,
they appear to be erratic, bracketing DOD figures. This is because
of the nature of the problem, examining and comparing a sum of
three figures to one individual figure. Additionally, the budget
figures for defense are proposed at general levels (rounded)
,
allowing the Department of Defense some degree of flexibility in
the actual allocation within the services.
These appear to be the major differences between DOD and DON
account allocations. The remaining accounts appear to reflect the
same general allocation of funds as those found for the aggregate
of DOD.
When an examination of DON allocation levels is made
excluding Marine Corps and Reserve programs, the trends shown above
are even more visible. Marine Corps and Reserve funding account
for anywhere between 9 and 14 percent of the annual budget,
reducing the effects of common size analysis of the DON composite
budget. With Marine and reserve program excluded, all accounts
except MPN, MILCON and FH reflect higher rates of allocation by 2
and 3 percent. MILCON and FH experience gains of approximately 0.1
percent, while MPN actually decreases by almost 4.7 percent.
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In this examination, procurement accounts oscillate between
37 and 4 percent of the total budget, manpower between 19 and 22
percent, RDT&E between 10 to 12 percent, and operations and
maintenance between 28 and 32 percent. Table 7 shows the effects
of omitting Marine Corps and Reserve program funding on the base
year 1985, highlighting the importance of specific appropriations.
Table 7 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY TOTAL OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY
(percentage of the total DON budget for active forces only)
MPN OMN PRO RDT&E MILCON FH OTHER
19.4 30.3 36.1 11.0 1.8 0.8 0.6
Recalling the same data from table 4, the differences are
readily apparent:
MPN OMN PRO RDT&E MILCON FH OTHER
24.1 29.5 33.8 9.7 1.7 0.7 0.5
In summary, MPN is well below DOD levels because of the less
manpower intensive missions and strategy of the Navy, and
procurement is higher due to the hardware intensive nature of the
Navy, while other DON accounts general reflect the same levels as
the DOD average.
3 . Operations and Maintenance within the Pacific Fleet
In general, the Pacific Fleet consumes a large share of the
DON O&M funds. On average, the pacific fleet consumes between 25
and 40 percent of the Navy's entire O&M funds, while the atlantic
fleet consumes only 20 to 30 percent.
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The Operations and Maintenance appropriations cover a myriad
of different accounts (AG/SAG's) , from fuel for ships and aircraft,
civilian pay, per diem and travel, to repair parts, and maintenance
costs
.
Within the Pacific Fleet, operations and maintenance
allocations have fluctuated. Although the trend has been similar
to those discussed earlier, with outlays increasing to a peak in
fiscal year 1987 followed by decreases, the disparity between years
is greater.
For instance, starting in the year 1981, the total O&M budget
was $4,67 6 billion, down 8 percent from 1980' s O&M budget level.
Examining just the topline for O&M, the trend is shown in table 8
:
Table 8 PACIFIC FLEET OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE TOTALS
(percentage change from previous year)
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91
15.8 7.1 -3.3 12.4 -7.5 9.9 -9.2 8.0 -5.0 -8.0
The trend alternates between flood and drought, swelling by
8 to 10 percent from the previous budget, and contracting by 5 to
9 percent. In nominal terms, the outlay level was lowest at $3.98
billion in 1981, to a high of $5.46 billion in 1987, then down to
$4.67 billion in 1991.
Conspicuous in table 6 are the two periods at either end of
the spectrum where an increase or decrease has spanned a period of
two years. In the case of the increases between 1981 and 1983,
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this heralding the new Reagan policy, where the decrease of 1990
and 1991 may be the result of the new policy for the 1990' s.
The pacific fleet operations and maintenance funds are
accounted for in several manners. One way is within budget
activities, or grouping by Major Force Programs. The areas where
CINCPACFLT allocates O&M funds are to:
• BA 1: Strategic Forces, consisting of strategic offensive and
defensive weapons along with related personnel, headquarters,
logistic and support.
• BA 2: General Purpose Forces, consisting of all conventional
(non-nuclear) combat units, related organizations, logistics
and organic support
.
• BA 3: Intelligence and Communications, consisting of
intelligence, security, and communication programs, including
resources related primarily to centrally directed DOD support
functions
.
• BA 4: Airlift and Sealift forces, consisting of airlift,
sealift, traffic management, and water terminal activities,
including command, logistic and support units in this area.
• BA 9: Administration and Associated activities, comprised of
resources for the administrative support of departmental and
major administrative headquarters, field commands, and
administrative activities not counted elsewhere.
By applying common size analysis to these budget activities
two major trends are discovered, an increase in the amounts
allocated to strategic forces, apparently at the expense of general
purpose forces, and increasing allocations to airlift and sealift
forces, possibly in development of rapid deployment and
prepositioned forces. Table 9 illustrates these trends:
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Table 9 PACIFIC FLEET O&M BY BUDGET ACTIVITIES
(percentage of total annual O&M)
FY 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91
BA1 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.3 2.3 3.0 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.8
BA2 98 98 98 93 94 89 89 90 87 92 91
BA4 4.7 4.4 8.2 6.3 5.5 6.2 4.7 5.3
Excluded from this analysis is BA 9, negligible in size when
compared to the budget activities in table 9, and BA 11, Special
Operations Forces, added to the Major Force Program structure in
1987, and funded at less than 1 percent of the O&M annual budget.
While small in comparison to the overall totals,
Administration and Associated costs, BA 9, has a great effect on
forces in general . It has doubled in size nominally over the
period from $100,000 to more than $200,000, an increase of 100
percent in 11 years, surpassing inflation rates, reflecting perhaps
an expanding base of administrative requirements for all commands
and consequently an expanding administrative structure.
In conclusion, while general purpose forces consume the
greatest amount of CINCPACFLT' s O&M funding, the rate has
diminished. Conversely, strategic force allocations have increased
steadily from 1981 to 1991 in the percentage of total funds
consumed annually, as have the areas of Airlift and Sealift and
Administrative forces. It appears that shifts in strategies have
driven the O&M budget, modernizing strategic capabilities, and
expanding the capabilities of forces that may be called upon in
regional conflicts, and in support of forward deployed forces.
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III. IMPLICATIONS OF PAST BUDGETS AND CONTINGENCIES
The processes for formulation, adjustment and enactment of the
federal and defense budget have evolved over time, changing as new
reforms are put in place in an effort to correct deficiencies in
the process. In each new fiscal year, the same complaints are
voiced, namely, the process is too complex to comprehend, and too
involved to be used effectively. Thus, new reforms are introduced
periodically and the existing process is forced to a new direction
through enactment of new legislation. The process of formulating
and enacting federal budgets has grown into an enormous,
repetitive, circuitous, year-long task. In the case of the defense
budget, the process is even longer, since armed services are
required by Congress to propose budgets in biennial format.
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR DEFENSE IN FEDERAL BUDGETING
There are several facets of the federal budgeting process
that have enormous impacts upon the Department of Defense's budget
process and practices. First of all, the defense budget is
proposed on a biennial basis, while the majority of the federal
budget is not. The majority of federal spending is fixed in the
base or "encumbered" . Encumbered and non-discretionary funds are
those dedicated to programs that are placed into law through
specific legislation language that ensures the "life" of the
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program. The enacting law is constructed so that it specifically
requires deliberate action on the part of Congress to overturn any
of the provisions made within the program. If Congress fails to
take alternative action then the program receives funding in every
subsequent federal budget until legislation is enacted otherwise to
alter provisions, correct economic projections, or cancel the
program.
Provisions in the initial enactment bills include such things
as cost-of-living-allowances (COLA's) to federal employees and
retirees and increases to benefits from Social Security.
Provisions are based on economic assumptions formulated at the time
of the initial enactment and are formally placed into the initial
legislation by the legislative program's sponsor.
On the other hand, discretionary funds are those allocated
on an annual basis. These funds are provided to defense and
general government operations. They tend to be less stable than
non-discretionary funds, directed and re-directed on the margin to
areas deemed most needy in each year.
As the size of the federal budget has grown, so have the
discretionary and non-discretionary budgets. Defense spending has
grown but it has not kept pace with the growth of non-discretionary
and entitlement spending. The effect has been to "crowd out"
defense spending, as the following explanation notes:
"It is convenient to think of the federal budget (which now
consumes 22 percent of the U.S. GNP) as consisting of four
principal elements: entitlements (money given directly to
individuals based on long-term legislative commitments)
,
defense, interest on the national debt, and everything else.
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Entitlements now consume roughly 50 percent of the federal
budget - a growing fraction. Defense consumes about 25
percent, and if the president's proposed budget is executed,
by the mid-1990' s defense will represent the smallest fraction
of annual government spending and of the GNP since just before
Pearl Harbor, with the exception of 1948. Interest on the
national debt now consumes about 15 percent - about two thirds
of the amount spent on defense and growing as the national
debt increases while defense shrinks. The rest of the
government's expenditures combined total about 9 percent of
the federal budget." 4
In other words, if the size of the federal budget and
taxation are to be held constant, and entitlements and the payments
on the national debt continue to grow, defense and the remaining
government expenditures must be reduced. Defense spending,
consuming 25 percent of the budget and representing over 80 percent
of the discretionary budget is where much reduction will be made.
Additionally, because defense spending is discretionary or
controllable, it is a relatively easy target for reduction.
Generally, discretionary funds are thought of as politically
vulnerable. Since defense spending accounts for so much of the
federal budget discretionary funds, it becomes a lightning rod for
deficit cutters. 5 It is not unrealistic to assume that at some
point in the future defense spending may be limited to a figure
that is determined by decision makers relative to an "acceptable"
deficit level, i.e. using the defense budget to reduce the deficit.
4Kenneth L. Adelman and Norman R. Augustine, The Defense
Revolution (San Francisco, ICS Press, 1990), p. 84.
5ibid.
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The desire of the public to establish control over the
national debt and reduce the rate of growth in federal budget
expenditures was a major issue in budgeting during the 1980' s. One
piece of evidence of this desire is the proposal and adoption of
the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Act in 1985, also known
as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH I) , and less than 2 years later
the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act
(GRH II)
.
The desired effect of GRH I and II was to control the size
of the national debt and budget deficits, setting maximum deficit
levels for future budget years until a balanced budget (zero
deficit) could be achieved. Each act included a timetable and
deficit ceilings for each year, as follows:
Table 1 GRAMM-RUDMAN-HOLLINGS DEFICIT TARGETS
(billions of dollars)
FY 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93
GRH I 171.9 144.0 108.0 72.0 36.0 NA NA
GRHII NA NA 144.0 136.0 100.0 64.0 28.0
(NA meaning not applicable)
GRH II was enacted when GRH I was deemed to be too
optimistic, with unrealistic goals in the initial years forcing
immediate cuts that would be among the largest in U.S. history.
Additionally, GRH was seen as lacking in enforcement of the new
process of "sequestration". If deficit targets were not met 6
6GRH II calls for a budget to be accepted that is actually
only within $10 billion of the mandated deficit target for fiscal
years 90, 91, and 92. No cushion was extended for 1993.
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within the budget process timetable, sequestration would reduce the
budget, with cuts across the board as directed by OMB cuts
calculated to meet the set goals.
The public popularity of GRH I and II reflected the direction
in which Americans said they want to move in federal budgeting.
Contrary to what most Americans want is the actual actions taken.
The public as a whole and political decision makers have rejected
attempts to raise taxes and reduce entitlements. They have voiced
their choice in support of reducing the deficit and spending, but
have failed to support actions moving in this direction.
Of a greater consequence to federal budgeting is the bi-
partisan Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA) . The purpose of the
BEA is different from that GRH I and II, (controlling deficits) .
Instead of controlling the size of the deficit, it changes
perspective to controlling the size of expenditures and the total
amount of federal spending. The effects of this shift in
perspective may have great impact. In short, "it marks a
significant departure from recent practice in federal budgeting and
moves toward a no fault budget process". 7
The impetus to change the previous budgeting system was
enormous
:
"In the summer and fall of 1990, the budget process had become
so painful, the potential sequestration amount so large ($110
billion) , the potential cost of the Savings and Loan Bailout
so high ($100 billion for FY 1991) and the gulf between
leaders and followers so great, that the old budget process
7Richard Doyle and Jerry McCaffery, The Budget Enforcement Act
of 1990: The Path to No Fault Budgeting.
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was doomed. New military responsibilities in the Persian Gulf
complicated this picture, For example, how could defense be
expected to take a sequestration of $55 billion on
approximately $290 billion while it was building up a military
presence in Saudi Arabia? After a period of intense
legislative maneuvering in congress, including the repudiation
of the President's position by his own party in the House, the
Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 was passed. Its immediate
effect was to change the deficit targets and cancel the $110
billion sequestration. Thus it returned some sort of normalcy
to federal government operations, but it was more than just
and extension of GRH I or II" 8 .
The act is purposely short-term, allowing changes in the near
future dependent upon the events in and outside the United States.
The BEA contains guidance for the years 1991 through 1995, but the
spending authority totals or limits are binding only through 1993.
Perhaps the greatest change made by the BEA is the placement
of spending caps on discretionary spending. In the immediate
future, FY 1991 through 1993, discretionary spending is divided
into three categories: defense, international affairs and domestic
spending. The caps are shown in table 2:
Table 2 BEA DISCRETIONARY SPENDING CAPS
(millions of dollars BA)
FY 91 92 93 94 95
DEFENSE 288, 918 291, 643 291,785 * *
INTL AFF 20, 100 20,500 21,400 * *
DOMESTIC 182,700 191,300 198,300 * *
TOTAL 491,718 503,443 511,485 510,800 517,700




In the years 1994 and 1995, only caps for the totals of
discretionary spending are stipulated, allowing decision makers to
allocate funds to areas they deem necessary.
In examining the figures of the earliest years, it can be seen
that total discretionary spending between years 1991 and 1992
increases by only about 2.4 percent, and by about 1.7 percent
between 1992 and 1993. During this period defense will have
minimal increases, 0.9 percent between the first years, and less
than .5 percent between 1992 and 1993. However, domestic spending
will increase by approximately 4.7 percent.
In terms of the percentage of total discretionary spending
consumed by defense (previously around 80 percent)
,
percentage of
the total federal budget devoted to defense, and as the percentage
of the projected GNP devoted to National Defense, the BEA has the
following effects:
Table 3 EFFECTS OF BEA
(percentage of totals)
FY 91 92 93
DISCRETIONARY 57.4 56.8 54.5
TOTAL FEDERAL 21.5 20.3 19.9
PERCENT GNP 5.3 4.6 4.3
The implications of a future policy such as this are
significant
:
"The defense spending caps continue the negative real growth
pattern that began in 1985. Compared to the baseline, defense
spending will be reduced by $182 billion over five years, a 20
percent reduction in inflation-adjusted growth, More than a
third (36 percent) of the total savings in the five year
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budget agreement will come from defense. With the notable
exception of the off-budget funding for Desert Shield, these
defense cuts represent the peace dividend". 9
The act also has several other impacts on federal budgeting
that differentiate it from an extension of GRH. The new deficit
limits set by the act are vastly different from the previous limits
of GRH (and the way in which the deficit is calculated has been
changed)
:







lenotes no provj.sion for this \'ear)
BEA has another feature that provides flexibility. It allows the
President the discretion of changing targets three times a year in
1992 and 1993, first adjusting for economic and technical factors,
next when OMB releases its initial sequester report on 20 August
revising discretionary spending caps, and finally when OMB releases
its final sequester report 15 days after the end of the
Congressional session.
The major enforcement tool in the previous reforms (GRH I and
II) was an annual sequester, whereas the BEA allows the President
to use a sequester in three different ways:
'ibid
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1. A general sequester if the maximum deficit target amounts are
not met, with adjusted targets through FY 1993 and GRH II
procedures in FY 1994-95.
2. A mini-sequester on each of the discretionary spending envelopes
- Defense, International Affairs and Domestic spending for fiscal
years 1991 to 1993.
3. A mini-sequester of entitlements covered by GRH to make up for
any new entitlement spending or tax cuts that are not paid for10 .
Additionally, the act removes the $10 billion dollar cushion
provided for by GRH in FY 1991-93, and the current GRH
sequestration process will go back into effect for FY 1994-95 with
a $15 billion cushion.
The BEA spells out the immediate future in federal budgeting,
and the effects for defense will be widely felt.
B. CONSIDERATIONS FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGETING
Separate from the issues above are several major issues for
the Department of Defense.
1 . General Trends
In addition to the trend of cost cutting in the defense
budget is the issue of base closures. This issue was first
introduced to Congress in 1987 when it was pointed out that many of
the military's installations have aged significantly, and are a
major drain on military funds (operations and maintenance, military
construction, and family housing funds in particular) . In order to
reduce this drain, the Secretary of Defense suggested closing bases
as a measure to free-up funds within the defense budget for higher
10ibid
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priority programs. Congress intervened fearing reductions in
legislators' districts, agreeing to vote on whether to close bases
identified as not contributing to DOD goals by the Secretary of
Defense. The concept was good, however, execution of the plan has
been less than satisfactory.
Political finger-pointing has been the one result in this
matter. The concept found support when proposed, with no major
dissention until actual cuts were proposed in decision makers' back
yards. Once the size of the cuts were revealed and their impacts
on districts calculated the plan stalled, and is still in front of
the Congress today, almost 5 years after its initial proposal.
While DOD plans to close approximately 15 facilities as a result of
decisions in 1989 and 1990, the issue is still being considered and
will soon become a reality, now that an independent commission has
been appointed to review the Secretary's proposals, and forward
recommendations to the President. The initiative is sound but a
few pertinent issues were overlooked at the time it was proposed.
The first issue overlooked is an economic one that many
people do not quite understand, i.e., that it actually costs money
to save money in closing bases. The amount of effort to close
bases in the short run is tremendous, as is the cost. It is only
in the long run that the cost savings will be achieved. In order
to close bases the current and future year defense budgets would
have to grow, rather than decline (in accounts related to closure)
as they are projected to do.
45
The second major issue that was overlooked was the cost of
toxic waste clean-up, with most costs being absorbed by the
services. These costs are estimated to run into the billions, and
the time required to do an adequate clean-up is now estimated to
run into decades. These funds and time estimates are probably just
the tip of iceberg on this issue. Again, the size of defense
budgets would have to grow, not decline to meet the requirements.
Because of the perceptions of the size and waste within
defense budgets there tends to be greater scrutiny of proposed
budgets. Consequently, DOD and Congress have targeted programs
construed as waste and abuse, and the MILDEPs have instituted
measures to deal with accusations and offenders. Budgeting as a
whole has become a more visible facet of military duties.
The greatest implication of adopting a cost-conscious or cost
reduction approach is in the area of the DOD's and the military
department and services' missions. For example, the Navy is an
instrument of national policy, charged with conducting operations
at sea in support of national objectives. If the military as a
whole is experiencing less funding in all budget areas it appears
that the missions charged of any service will be less than those of
today, or at least national interests and objectives need to be re-
defined. As funds are cut-back, so will be mission areas and
spheres of influence around the world.
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2 . Specific Account Trends
In examining Department of Defense budgets, the trends within
each of the major appropriations have significant implications.
Within the military pay account, the past trend showed
increases through 1987 then tapered down slightly, and jumped back
to where almost 28 percent of the DOD total budget was allocated to
military pay. The implication here is that with a down-turn in the
economy, a large number of non-career active duty personnel may
desire to re-enlist for economic security reasons, keeping the size
of the forces relatively unchanged, or even increasing it. The
percentage of the budget allocated to military pay would then be
unchanged or relatively stable. However, the DOD plan is to reduce
military endstrength through 1997.
Within the operations and maintenance accounts the
implications are several, and are inter-related to other accounts.
First, because of the complexity of the weapons systems that the
services have been procuring in recent years, and the use of
printed circuit boards and "black boxes", maintenance and repair
costs will be driven higher. In order to deal with these problems
more training and education is needed, driving travel and related
costs up. To be proficient at operating complex ystems more
training is needed, in the classroom and simulators, as well as in
actual operating environments. Thus, education costs increase
along with increases in flying hours and steaming days. With all
these costs taking large bites out of the total O&M allocations,
the solution seems to be in a lower operating tempo, mobilizing
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fewer numbers of ships for each commitment. In order to continue
as we do today, more O&M is needed. However, this also is not
projected for future budgets.
In the procurement accounts, DOD responds to market
conditions. Producers of major weapons systems have benefitted
greatly through the Reagan build-up, winning contracts with large
unit orders, keeping their demand high. The market is one where
higher prices are the norm, where a large research and development
is recoverable through the government, and federal oversight is not
as tight as advertised. The costs of new weapons systems are
skyrocketing, driving the unit costs up, as well as prices for
support systems. In order to buy new systems more funds are
needed. In order to "buy cheaply" and modernize existing platforms
to meet increased threat capabilities much more funding is needed.
The implication is either more funds allocated or less hardware,
and less capable hardware will be available. Again, this calls for
re-examining national interests and national defense goals.
Research and development funding is an investment in
tomorrow, leading the forces with new technology to increase our
capabilities, or even reduce costs through new methods and
materials. Funding should continue at current levels at least to
ensure a technological edge for our forces, or again, a re-
examination of our strategy and goals is needed to see if they
contradict our capabilities. However, the RDT&E budget will be




Military construction and family housing are small components
of the total DOD budget, but will continue to consume more funds as
buildings age and new weapon systems are brought on line with
special support requirements. If funds are cut below a baseline
here then future costs may become grow exponentially, requiring
replacement of older facilities. The future budget does not
accomodate this demand as reflected in BEA spending targets for DOD
and DOD' s own budgetary planning.
C. CONTINGENCIES BUDGETING: DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM
On August 2, 1990, the national military forces of Iraq, at
the direction of their leader, Saddam Hussein, invaded the
sovereign country of Kuwait, occupied the nation, and announced the
annexation of the country as a part of his own. In response to
this wanton act of aggression, the United States reacted with what
was believed to be the responsible action by many nations and world
leaders. This section of this thesis will not deal with the
military operations of Desert Shield and Desert Storm, but will
deal with some of the budgetary issues realted to the support of
these operations.
Ironic is the fact that this invasion occurred on the same
day President Bush announced his new defense strategy for the
United States. Even more ironic is that in the face of aggression
this new defense strategy called for heavy cuts in funding,
manpower, procurement, and a restructuring of the armed services.
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In the weeks following the initial invasion, the United
States met diplomatically with the leaders of Saudi Arabia,
offering the U.S. assessment of the situation, and the offer of
using U.S. military forces in defense of Saudi Arabia. King Fahd,
requested aid in the form of military assistance, and it was
received almost immediately. The U.S. Department of Defense
mobilized air, ground, and naval forces immediately. Active units
and reservists began touching down in the Persian Gulf within one
week of Iraq's actions, and by the middle of October the United
States had deployed well over 200,000 military personnel and over
200,000 short tons of cargo by both sealift and airlift 11 .
To augment the immediate response by active duty forces, the
President called upon the nation's reserve forces. On August 23,
1990, he exercised his authority under Section 673B of Title 10 of
the U.S. Code authorizing the Secretaries of Defense and
Transportation to call Selected Reserve units and personnel to
active duty for Operation Desert Shield12 .
The United States then followed a diplomatically circuitous
route, seeking assistance from the other nations of the area, and
other nations with whom the U.S. has allied with and depended on in
the past. The result was a multi-national coalition of military
force, defending Saudi Arabia from further aggression on the part
of Iraqi forces.




The United States also sought formal condemnation and
sanctions against Iraq through the United Nations. This was
accomplished, and 12 United Nations Resolutions were formulated,
later acting as mission statements in Operation Desert Storm.
Operation Desert Storm commenced on February 27, 1991,
expelling the Iraqi forces from Kuwait within a matter of days,
liberating the occupied nation.
The cost estimates of the Persian Gulf actions have run as
high as $60 billion for the members of the coalition, with some
estimates running higher. The initial cost estimate made by the
U.S. armed forces for mobilization of reserve units and increased
fuel prices was more $800 million alone.
Perhaps as important as the actual costs is the way in which
this venture was funded. The United States was able to obtain
promises of subsidies from coalition nations of sizable amounts.
The total amount was initially estimated to cover half of the
projected costs, although now they appear to be significantly
greater.
Within the United States, funding was provided in a different
manner. Initially, the incremental costs associated with Operation
Desert Shield and the increased fuel prices were covered by shifts
of $800 million in previously appropriated DOD funds and by a
Fiscal Year 1990 supplemental appropriation, totalling more than
$2.1 billion.
The BEA specified that incremental costs directly associated
with Operation Desert Shield were to be treated as emergency
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funding requirements, and not subject to the overall defense budget
limits in the budget agreement.
Furthermore, for fiscal year 1991, the incremental costs of
Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm not offset by the
contributions from allies or funds from regular defense
appropriations are addressed by a Fiscal Year 1991 supplemental
appropriations request. Cash contributions from our allies and
from private donors are deposited in a Defense Cooperation Account,
with deposits and withdrawals reported to Congress on a monthly
basis. The supplemental appropriations request was submitted and
enacted by Congress in the first half of fiscal year 1991.
The significance of this funding response is that in the
future planned according to the BEA, with reducing budgets, any
conflict that requires a mobilization of forces will need to be
funded as an emergency, dealt with after troops and equipment are
moved, either by a supplemental appropriations or amendments to
appropriation bills. Emergency reprogramming can be done by the
services, but without the degree of flexibility required.
The purse strings for such operations will be held closely by
Congress. And given the urgency in which funds need to be released
under threat of war, riders of all types may be proposed in an
attempt to pass bills that would not otherwise pass, delaying the





As the defense establishment enters a new decade there is
uncertainty in funding in the years after 1995. The budget for
defense through the year 1993 has been spelled out in no uncertain
terms by the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, and while the future
years of 1994 and 1995 do not have concrete spending caps, budgets
following the trends set in the fiscal years 1991 through 1993 may
be expected. With the recent events in the world leading people to
believe the United States no longer faces any direct Soviet threat,
only regional threats instead, there is a belief that a there is
little need for large scale forces. In light of these attitudes,
the President announced his new defense strategy for the United
States within this "new world" on August 2 1990, ironically, the
same day that Saddam Hussein forcibly invaded Kuwait. The new
strategy calls for a future of reduced procurement, reduction in
manpower, a subsequent reduction in force structure, as well as
reductions in the level of operations. This chapter presents
budget projections from 1992 to 1997 13 . Data are presented in the
same format as in Chapter II to facilitate comparison.
1 . National Defense and the Department of Defense
Earlier, it was shown that in the past decade allocations for
National Defense and for the Department of Defense averaged
13Based on Department of Defense published assumptions in the
FY 1992-93 budget.
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approximately 6 to 6.5 percent of the nation's Gross National
Product. Recently, projections made by OMB indicate a future of
continued economic growth and an increasing GNP, although not at
the rate experienced in the mid 1980' s. Nonetheless, this leads to
a rational expectation of a similar growth within the defense
budgets. However, the actions of decision makers in passing the
BEA contradict this reasonable expectation. In fact, the Secretary
of Defense, in his report to the President and Congress of January
1991, stated:
"By 1995, we expect the defense budget to be less than 4
percent of GNP,the lowest level since before the attack on
Pearl Harbor."
The percentage of the GNP devoted in the years 1991 through 1993
are 5.3, 4.9, and 4.6 percent respectively. Table 1 illustrates
the total budget authority allocated to National Defense under the
BEA:
Table 1 BEA BUDGET AUTHORITY TO NATIONAL DEFENSE
(millions of dollars)
FISCAL YEAR 91 92 93
NATL DEFENSE 288, 918 291,643 291,785
PERCENT GNP 5.3 4.9 4.6
The budget authority for National Defense for fiscal years
1994 and 1995 are not set as part of the BEA, although total
spending caps for the total discretionary spending are set. They
are $510.8 billion and $517.7 billion respectively.
Table 2 shows the projections of outlays the Department of
Defense for the fiscal years 1993 through 1996.
54
Table 2 PROJECTED NATIONAL DEFENSE OUTLAYS 1993 TO 1996
(millions of dollars)
FY 93 94 95 96
CURRENT $ 291, 986 286, 666 288,620 293,235
1985 $ 370,484 394,769 392,028 412, 132
% CHANGE 1.6 6.6 -.7 5.1
These figures do not represent the funds made available to
the DOD, but to all agencies representing National Defense
interests. For the year 1993, the remaining funds left in outlays
under the BEA is approximately $70 million.
The figures shown in Table 2 reflect the actions of decision
makers mentioned above, restraining defense spending, contrasting
the trend set by the first Reagan administration, and following the
trends of the second Reagan administration. The funding pattern
shown in table 2 is not enough to counteract the effects of annual
inflation, meaning that defense will sustain a reduction annually
in real terms. In keeping with this trend and in line with the
President's statements on the new defense strategy, it appears the
administration' s policy will be to maintain a force reduced to a
predetermined baseline size and capability (base force)
.
Because budgeting is incremental in nature, table 2 reflects
that, the pattern is alternating increases followed by very small
nominal increases
.
Within the budget function of National Defense there is an
expected redirection of funds within appropriations. Table 3
illustrates projected appropriation levels:
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Table 3 PROJECTED NATIONAL DEFENSE OUTLAYS BY APPROPRIATION
(percent of annual total)
FY 93 94 95 96
MP 27.7 27.9 27.6 27.6
O&M 30.2 30.8 30.7 31.2
PROC 24.7 24.6 25.0 25.5
RDT&E 14.2 14.6 14.0 13.2
MILCON 1.7 1.8 2.2 2.3
FH 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4
In examining the projected levels of the budget allocated for
military pay and allowances, absent are the patterns of the early
1980' s. The projections reflect a stable population within DOD,
consuming about 27.5 percent of the annual budgets. In what
appears to be an era of restraint, manpower reduction is the
mandate. Today, the total number of uniformed personnel stands at
about 1,974,100. By 1995 this number will be cut to 1,633,000, or
a reduction of more than 9 percent. The initial brunt of the
reductions will be felt by the Army, dropping in the number of
divisions from 28 to 12 active and 6 reserve by 1995. Initially,
it appears the Navy and Air Force will not suffer the same drastic
cuts, although the long term results will be similar.
Included in this same trend is the funding of reserve
programs. The military pay and allowances accounts are the source
of funds for pay of active duty and reserve personnel. To maintain
the same percentage of a relatively stable budget devoted to pay
accounts with reduced active duty personnel, means either an
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increase in pay levels or an increase in the number of reserves
(and retirees) receiving benefits. The former statement is the
intended case. The administration has addressed this issue by
indicating their desire to increase compensation in order to
maintain a high quality, smaller force. The administration has
also announced intentions to reduce the reserve forces from today'
s
level by 16 percent in 1993.
As projected, the operations and maintenance accounts will
consume roughly 30 to 31 percent of the total annual budget, down
from the levels of the early 1980' s, and following the baseline
levels established in the late 1980' s. Operation tempos will
reflect those trends in fiscal years 1990 and 1991. While table 3
shows increases in the percentage of the total projected outlays,
the topline for O&M will be reduced by more than 2 percent
nominally. In real dollar terms the reduction will be greater,
approximately 6 to 7 percent.
The most noticeable change in the appropriation levels is in
the Procurement accounts. Projected levels increase slightly over
the period, but tend to be around 25 percent. This is down from
the previous decade, where procurement approached 30 percent in
1987, and then was trimmed to 27 and 28 percent. The average
decrease is approximately 3 percent. Based on the total National
Defense budget of 1993, this means a decrease of $8.76 billion from
procurement accounts, redirected elsewhere. The Secretary of
Defense officially stated his intentions in January 1991 in this
area, saying,
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"procurement and acquisition programs will receive careful
scrutiny and strong support. Major adjustments have been made
in the programs for the B-2 bomber, the C-17 transport, SSN-21
submarine, and Milstar communications satellite. Procurement
of a number of lower-priority military systems has been
terminated. Taxpayers' funds for weapons systems will be
spent wisely 14 ."
In support of this statement, in 1991 funds for the F-15E aircraft,
Apache helicopter, M-l tank, and the TACIT RAINBOW cruise missile
programs have been canceled or redirected.
Next, following the trend set in the earlier decade, RDT&E
accounts will grow to a larger percentage of the annual total. In
1991 the appropriation level was 12.4 percent, growing slowly to
the peak of 1994 at 14.6 percent, and then decreasing to 13.2
percent in 1996. In the administration's latest defense strategy
statement, technological advantage was addressed:
"it is apparent that in the years ahead we will need to
strengthen our technological edge. The speed of technological
change raises unprecedented challenges. The spread of modern
weaponry has supplied the number of sophisticated Third World
arsenals that include such items as advanced tanks, attack
submarines, and cruise missiles 15 ."
Judging from the visibility given to RDT&E by administration
officials, and proposals for weapons systems such as the Strategic
Defense Initiatives pursued by the Reagan and Bush administrations,
it is expected that funding for research and development will
continue at least at the levels projected in table 3.
14Annual Report to the President and Congress , by the Secretary
of Defense, January 1991.
15ibid.
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In military construction accounts, a surge is projected in
1995 and 1996, repeating a similar pattern of surge and contraction
to baselines like that displayed in 1987 and 1988. Additionally,
family housing will have a slight increase in funding, showing a
small increase from 1987 through 1996.
2 . Department of the Navy
As the Department of Defense moves into the future, the
Department of the Navy is projected to weather the storm better
than the other services. Looking at most of the policies and
programs selected to reduce and restructure forces, the Navy seems
to suffer the least number of sacrifices. In the new defense
strategy of the 1990' s the Secretary of Defense has been quoted as
saying:
"We need robust naval forces that enable us to exercise our
world role across oceans that divide us from allies and
trading partners. And we need an offensive nuclear capability
along with a strategic defense, to deter and defend against
tomorrow's ballistic missile threats 16 ."
That statement would tend to indicate the strategy of the
1990' s hinges upon a strong Navy and Air Force, so it is reasonable
to expect more funding in naval general purpose and strategic
forces, and in strategic forces of the Air Force.
In the nearest budget years, 1992 and 1993, the Navy
continues to receive a greater share of the total DOD budget than
the other services. The relative percentage expected is greater
16ibid.
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than the rational baseline of 32 percent of the total DOD budget.
Table 4 shows the percentage share of the total DOD budget:
Table 4 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ANNUAL BUDGET AUTHORITY
(millions of dollars)
FY 92 93
DOD 278,282 277, 894
DON 91,631 92,483
PERCENT 32.9 33.3
Although this disparity is not great, 0.9 and 1.3 percent,
the results are significant. In 1992 this amounts to more than
$2.5 billion, and $3.6 billion in 1993. This trend may or may not
continue into years 1994 through 1996, but it has been present as
far back as the late 1970' s.
An examination of the appropriation levels in the next fiscal
years reveals the following:
Table 5 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY TOTAL OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY












MPN 27, 633 27, 926
OMN 26,466 26,541
PROC 28,090 27,170
RDT&E 8, 199 9,488
MILCON 679 771
FH 880 713
In the MPN accounts a slight decrease is shown in table 5.
The additional table indicates a slight rise in nominal funding,
but this difference is negligible. The standing force of the Navy
will actually decline as DOD downsizes, from 551,400 active duty
persons in 1992 to 536,000 in 1993, and from 282,700 selected
reservists to 254,500 respectively.
Within the operations and maintenance account a similar
decrease will be felt. In terms of nominal funding the two years
will be almost constant, but will actually experience a reduction
in real dollar terms. The majority of the Navy's training
opportunities and expenses fall within the O&M accounts, in flying
hours and steaming days, as well as in travel funds. A reduction
in funds for training in the future seems to contradict the
administration's statements to support a more capable, ready force.
The trend in DON procurement will follow that of DOD as a
whole. So far, DON has sustained several major losses of
significant weapons systems. For example, funds for the A-12
attack aircraft, the V-22 Osprey vertical troop and transport
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attack aircraft, the V-22 Osprey vertical troop and transport
aircraft and F-14D fighter aircraft production have already been
canceled and redirected. Because of the "low priority" of these
programs, the Navy and Marine Corps will instead attempt to
complete assigned missions using the 25 and 30 year old A-6
Intruder attack CH-53 Sea Knight aircraft. Currently, DOD has no
platforms or programs identified or in development for relief for
these aircraft. Of course, Congress may alter these programs.
In 1992 and 1993, procurement accounts will again be thinned,
terminating the programs of the TRIDENT submarine, the P-7A ASW
patrol aircraft, the Navy Advance Tactical Fighter, and the Mark XV
aircraft identification systems. The only major procurement
programs will be the bringing on line of more AEGIS Weapons Systems
platforms, namely the ARLEIGH BURKE destroyers and TICONDEROGA
class cruisers. The procurement schedule and program plans for
these ships has been slowed in rate and scope as well.
Following the administration and DOD lead, RDT&E will
continue to grow in the year 1992 and 1993. The percentage of the
DON budget consumed by research and development will grow to 10.2
percent, approaching a level of $10 billion dollars.
Military construction and family housing will be funded at
almost a constant level in terms of percentage of the total budget,
experiencing slight nominal increases but real term losses.
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3 . Operations and Maintenance within the Pacific Fleet
The pacific fleet will experience a loss in funding levels
within the O&M allocations in the early years of the 1990' s.
Reductions will be made in all accounts. From a fleet level
perspective, the future is reflected in table 6:
Table 6 PACIFIC FLEET OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE
(millions of dollars, percentage change)
FY 93 94 95 96 97
TOTALS 5,114 4, 866 4,561 5,075 5,269
% CHANGE 3.8 -4.8 -6.3 11.3 3.8
In nominal and real dollar terms there is only one increase
projected (in 1996) with decreases in nominal and real terms in
every other year. The overall effect amounts to a significant
reduction in operations and maintenance funds.
Displayed by budget activities, the reductions appear in
table 7:
Table 7 PACIFIC FLEET O&M BY BUDGET ACTIVITIES
(percentage of total O&M budget)
FY 93 94 95 96 97
BA 1 5.8 5.8 6.4 6.0 5.8
BA 2 88.8 87.6 86.2 87.1 87.2
BA 3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1
BA 8 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4
BA 9 4.9 5.9 6.7 6.3 6.4
The implications of the data shown above is consistent with
the trends analyzed in Chapter 2. An increase in the percentage of
the budget is devoted to strategic forces and a much greater
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percentage dedicated to administration, at the expense of general
purpose forces
.
Additionally, the size of the budget allocated to BA 9 is
projected to grow, demonstrating the new importance of
Administration and associated costs, and possibly indicating new
levels of administrative requirements and a new administrative
structure
.
In conclusion, the size of future budgets for DOD and DON are
limited by the spending caps specified in the Budget Enforcement
Act of 1990. The trend set in the spending caps for budget
authority and outlays is negative real growth over the next three
years and, although spending caps are not set in years 1994 and
1995, the total discretionary caps are restrictive enough to force




The implications of the data presented here are many.
However, in general, the obvious fact is that the Department of
Defense and the Departments of the Armed Services will be forced to
sustain large cuts in funding and force strengths in the future.
The immediate future will be driven by the agreements made by the
administration in acceptance of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990,
limiting National Defense to a declining percentage of the total
federal budget in the fiscal years 1991 through 1993, and then part
of the capped discretionary spending in fiscal years 1994 and 1995.
In the past, particularly in the years 1981 through 1985, the
Department of Defense and Departments of the Armed Services enjoyed
budget abundance. This has changed significantly, and the future
appears to consist of budget trends in the opposite direction, down
in real terms to the levels of the late 1970' s.
The decline in the size of defense budgets started in fiscal
year 198 6, and although not decreasing in nominal terms, they have
decreased in real growth terms. One reason for this decline was
the mounting political pressures applied to the administration and
Congress to reduce the federal deficit and the rate of growth in
the federal budget. This pressure was great enough to spawn
legislation designed to control both, changing the process by which
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the United States formulates, proposes and enacts budgets. The
legislation that has had and will have the greatest effect on the
defense budget is the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA)
.
In response to the political pressure on decision
makers to correct the nation's budgetary deficiencies, the
administration has announced a new defense strategy. It appears as
if the budget has driven the change in strategy more than the
changing world situation. Although the changes in threat
experienced since the 1989 have been significant in nature,
changing the social and political schema of the world, the
seriousness of the nation's budgetary problems were such that a new
strategy was required and inevitable. It was only a matter of time
before the United States would change its defense policies.
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the democratic uprisings in
Eastern Bloc countries facilitate the restructuring of the nation's
Armed Forces. And the USSR as the one opponent that has consumed
American thought since the 1950' s is diminishing in importance.
This may provide the national leadership with some breathing room
in the near term, unless the situation within the Soviet Union
worsens
.
In closing one other point needs to be addressed. The
resounding defeat of Iraqi forces in Operation Desert Storm may
easily be misconstrued. Although parts of the new defense strategy
were utilized, the force structure and hardware of the American
forces used in these operations were those that remained from 20
years of preparation to fight the Soviets, a force numerically
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superior in all aspects. What will be the consequence of 5, 10, or
15 years of reduced budgets for the Armed Forces? What will our
forces be capable of doing then?
B. SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions of this thesis may be summarized as the
following
:
• The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 will be the driving force
for the defense budget through 1995.
• Provisions with the BEA call for a reduction in the size of
the defense budget as a percentage of GNP from 5.3 percent in
1991, to 4 . 6 percent in 1993, and expectations are for further
decreases
.
• Within DOD, funding will be redirected by appropriation to
implement the new strategy, specifically more funds to
military pay and allowances, to research and development, and
away from operations and maintenance, remaining relatively
stable in military construction and family housing.
Procurement will also decline or remain at relatively steady-
state .
• In line with the new defense strategy, funds will also be
redirected for the modernization of the nation' s strategic
defenses, and for rapid deployment by airlift and sealift, at
the cost of general purpose forces.
• Although the need for consideration of regional contingencies
is reflected in the new defense strategy, it is not
appropriately addressed by the federal budgeting system,
meaning most contingencies will have to be funded by military
department reprogramming and supplemental appropriations or
amendments to appropriation bills as part of the annual
process
.
• Under the new defense strategy, all services will be reduced
and funding cut, although on the margin the Navy will not
suffer by a slight amount the size of the cuts directed to the
other services.
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With the reduction of funding for American armed forces, the
spheres of influence enjoyed by the United States may be reduced.
To maintain the same influence, American needs to develop a new
political strategy, whether it be through alliances, through
coalition of military forces, or appealing to other nation's moral
values. Coercion never has and never will be a viable alternative,
although the deterrence value from perceived threat of battle with
an armed force of the size and capability of the American armed
forces should not be underestimated.
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